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Abstract
Contemporary rising powers have often pursued a hesitant and ambiguous foreign-
policy and have belied the expectations of potential followers and established powers 
who would want them to engage more actively in global and regional governance. The 
existing analytical toolbox of International Relations does not offer suitable concepts to 
make sense of the widespread phenomenon of states that pursue hesitant, inconsistent 
courses of action and do not bring to bear their power resources to coherently 
manage international crises that potentially affect them. A notion that is frequently 
employed to describe this peculiar type of foreign policy is that of ‘reluctance’, but 
this concept has not been systematically defined, discussed or theorized. This article 
aims to introduce the concept of reluctance into the field of International Relations. It 
develops a conceptualization of reluctance by identifying the concept’s semantic field and 
discussing how reluctance relates to the similar but distinct notions of exceptionalism, 
isolationism, under-aggression and under-balancing (concept reconstruction); on that 
basis, the article outlines the constitutive dimensions of reluctance — hesitation and 
recalcitrance — and their operationalization (concept building). Several illustrative 
cases of (non-)reluctant rising powers are used to exemplify the concept structure and 
to show the analytical usefulness of the concept of reluctance, which refers to a distinct 
set of phenomena that are not addressed by other concepts in International Relations. 
An application of the concept allows us to identify policy shifts and differences across 
issue areas, as well as open up avenues for further research.
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Introduction
While the world seems to have become increasingly conflict-ridden and unpredictable, 
both established and rising powers frequently do not live up to the expectations of those 
who want them to provide leadership, order, governance and the management of interna-
tional crises (Schweller, 2014). While the US has been increasingly preoccupied with 
domestic problems over the past years, rising powers like India, Brazil, China or South 
Africa have not displayed a readiness to step into the fray and contribute to the provision 
of order beyond a certain point. The 2015 climate summit of Paris was successfully con-
cluded with an agreement, but rising powers continue to have strong reservations about 
binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions. In 2011, rising powers did not veto United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 on the protection of civilians in 
Libya, but they did not engage in stabilization efforts in the Middle East and North Africa 
either. Furthermore, even in their own regions, where they have a long history of engage-
ment and where their predominance is unequivocal, rising powers have pursued ambiva-
lent and indecisive foreign policies. Brazil, for example, has at times been proactive in 
dealing with South American countries, for instance, by promoting the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR), but it has been unwilling to delegate extensive decision-making 
powers to regional organizations and to ‘become the regional paymaster providing col-
lective public goods such as credit, aid or security’ (Merke, 2015: 184). South Africa’s 
approach to Africa has similarly been characterized as full of ‘ambiguities and contradic-
tions’ (Alden and Le Pere, 2009: 145), and India has pursued an ambivalent and reactive 
policy in South Asia, merely responding to initiatives developed by others despite its 
clear power preponderance (Ganguly, 2003). While Germany emerged as the regional 
power in Europe in the context of the Eurozone crisis (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013), 
several observers have noted that ‘[l]eadership from Berlin has been hesitant’ and 
plagued by a ‘capacity–expectations gap’ (Bulmer, 2014: 1245). Even China, which has 
been rather assertive in its own region, has been described as a ‘conflicted’ state 
(Shambaugh, 2011) lacking a clear grand strategy (Schweller, 2014: 69).
A notion that is frequently used in the literature to characterize this attitude of rising 
powers is reluctance. The Munich Security Report 2015 (Bunde and Oroz, 2015), a brief 
publication associated with the Munich Security Conference, is entitled Collapsing 
Orders, Reluctant Guardians?: it argues that the collapse of international order has itself 
been ‘both a driver and an effect of the increasing reluctance of its traditional guardians’ 
(Bunde and Oroz, 2015: 22), like the US, as well as of potential new guardians, the rising 
powers. India and Germany have both been dubbed ‘reluctant hegemons’ with regard to 
their regions (Mitra, 2003; Paterson, 2011) and South Africa has been termed a ‘reluctant 
leader’ in Africa (Esterhuyse, 2010).
We therefore have a term to describe the peculiar type of foreign policy that rising 
powers (and often established powers as well) are pursuing — reluctance. However, we 
lack a systematic understanding of what reluctance means. The existing analytical tool-
box of International Relations (IR) does not offer suitable concepts to make sense of the 
widespread phenomenon of powerful or rising states that pursue inconsistent, confusing 
courses of action and do not bring to bear their power resources to coherently manage 
international crises that potentially affect them. As will be discussed later in greater 
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detail, this issue is implicitly addressed in large sections of the literature – for example, 
through the concepts of exceptionalism, isolationism, under-aggression and under-bal-
ancing. However, these notions refer to distinct sets of phenomena that have only a few 
commonalities with reluctance, but are not able to account for the phenomenon of reluc-
tance itself.
Against this backdrop, this contribution aims to introduce reluctance into the study of 
international politics. It focuses on developing a thorough conceptualization of reluc-
tance, since the casual, unspecific usage of the term in the existing literature is not of 
much use beyond description. By contrast, if appropriately conceptualized, ‘reluctance’ 
can yield analytical benefits by helping us to make sense of the widespread indecisive-
ness and responsibility shirking that seem to have become distinctive features of contem-
porary international politics.
The conceptualization of reluctance builds upon and combines different approaches 
to concept reconstruction and concept building, which are briefly discussed in the next 
section. The actual conceptualization exercise proceeds as follows. First, based on a 
qualitative content analysis of selected IR literature that explicitly uses the notion of 
reluctance, I inductively identify the key issues usually associated with this term. This 
helps as a first approach to delineating the broader semantic field of reluctance, and 
thereby contributes to concept reconstruction, as suggested by Sartori (1984: 41–50). 
Based on this broader semantic field, in a second step, I move on to discussing the 
related but distinct notions of exceptionalism, isolationism, under-aggression and 
under-balancing, and I highlight why we need reluctance as an additional concept to 
make sense of a distinct set of phenomena. Based on the insights gained from situating 
the concept of reluctance in the existing IR literature, I proceed with the actual concept-
building exercise, which follows the guidelines outlined by Goertz (2006) in his work 
on social science concepts. I therefore: discuss the negative poles of reluctance — that 
is, what reluctance is not; develop two core ‘secondary’, constitutive dimensions of 
reluctance; and operationalize these two dimensions, developing indicators for empiri-
cal analysis. In a nutshell, I conceive of reluctance as a specific way or style of doing 
foreign policy that involves a hesitant attitude and a certain recalcitrance about con-
forming to the expectations articulated by others. To illustrate the analytical value of my 
conceptualization of reluctance, I finally apply the concept to an assessment of a range 
of cases of (non-)reluctant rising powers. I conclude by discussing how this more pre-
cise conceptualization of reluctance as a specific way of doing foreign policy can help 
us make sense of the policies of rising powers, and I identify a range of questions to be 
addressed by future research.
Mapping the field: Reconnecting concept reconstruction 
and concept building
While the importance of concepts in the social sciences cannot be underestimated, exten-
sive reflection on the process of defining and clarifying concepts remains rare, with 
notable exceptions (e.g. Collier et al., 2012; Goertz, 2006; Sartori, 1970, 1975, 1984). 
Among the few studies that explicitly deal with the issue of concept formation in the 
social sciences, there is disagreement on the first step to take. Sartori suggests that this 
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first step should always be ‘concept reconstruction’, which amounts to tracing the use of 
the concept in previous works in order to assess how others have defined it and to extract 
and systematize underlying characteristics (Sartori, 1984: 41–50). As a subsequent step, 
Sartori recommends ‘allocation of the term’, that is, the choice of a specific word to be 
associated with the concept one intends to study. To do this, one needs to relate the term 
that designates the concept to its semantic field to make sure that reconceptualization 
does not lead to a loss of meaning of other terms, or to an increase in ambiguity instead 
of greater clarity (Sartori, 1984: 51–53).1 By semantic field, Sartori (1984: 52) refers to 
‘a clustering of terms such that each of its component elements interacts with all the 
others, and (as with all systems) is altered by any alteration of the others’. Only after 
concept reconstruction and allocation of the term can we proceed to the main step of 
reconceptualization or concept building, according to Sartori. In a similar fashion, 
Adcock and Collier (2001: 531) argue that conceptualization — that is, the formulation 
of a systematized concept — must be based on an assessment of what they call the 
‘background concept’: the existing ‘broad constellation of meanings and understandings 
associated with a given concept’.
Much more than Sartori, Goertz (2006: 4) highlights that thinking about concepts 
involves going well beyond semantics — it implies carrying out a ‘theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the object or the phenomenon’ that is being conceptualized. 
Correspondingly, Goertz (2006: 5) thinks of concepts: in ontological terms, since con-
ceptualizations imply focusing on what constitutes a phenomenon; in causal terms, 
since the central dimensions of concepts have causal powers, which, in turn, shape theo-
ries that employ these concepts; and in realist terms, since concepts always relate to 
empirical phenomena. To adequately address these aspects, it is important to address the 
structure of concepts and the relationships between the different dimensions and levels 
within concepts in the concept-building exercise. According to Goertz (2006: 27, 
emphasis added), developing a concept amounts to ‘deciding what is important about an 
entity’. However, how can we make this essential decision? In other words, how do we 
know what is important about an entity? In order to avoid at least some of the arbitrari-
ness that might be associated with starting the concept-building exercise without appro-
priate groundwork, it is useful to start with concept reconstruction, as suggested by 
Sartori — or to assess the background concept, as Adcock and Collier (2001: 531) put 
it, or to apply the ‘context guideline’, according to Goertz and Mazur (2008: 19–20). 
The need to build upon previous uses of a concept seems particularly compelling for 
notions like reluctance, which are already frequently employed in the literature but in a 
confused and unspecific manner — that is, when concept building is used to clarify the 
meaning of an existing term.
Concept reconstruction: The broader semantic field
As a first step, it is therefore useful to map the field, that is, to analyse existing literature 
that uses the concept of reluctance in order to find out how the concept is defined, what 
notions and types of behaviour are usually associated with it, and what its ‘set of associ-
ated, neighboring terms’ (Sartori, 1984: 52) is. While the notion of reluctance is not 
specific to IR or to political science and is, indeed, frequently used in a range of fields, 
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from medicine to sociology and psychology, to analyse specific forms of behaviour, a 
striking commonality across disciplines is an absence of definitions or sophisticated 
operationalizations of reluctance. For example, clinical studies that deal with patients’ 
reluctance to take preventive medication, to undergo preventive tests or to seek treatment 
either simply equate reluctance with a choice not to do something (Quaid and Morris, 
1993) or, in a slightly more sophisticated manner, associate reluctance with a general 
resistance to taking medication (Port et al., 2001) or with the notion of not seeing a doc-
tor despite knowing one should do so (Meltzer et al., 2000). Studies in the field of sociol-
ogy simply operationalize reluctance by looking at different degrees of stated (un)
willingness (Bielby and Bielby, 1992). Moreover, to mention another example, in a study 
on reluctance to communicate undesirable information, reluctance is operationalized as 
a time lag in the transmission of information or as the transmission of incomplete infor-
mation (Rosen and Tesser, 1970).
In studies that focus on the reluctance of states in foreign policy, that is, in the fields 
of IR and history, we observe a similar lack of definitions. Most studies that prominently 
mention reluctance in their titles do not explicitly discuss the concept, and, in the case of 
books, do not even include the term in the index (e.g. Dueck, 2006; Fehl, 2012; Haass, 
1997; Lowe, 1967). Nevertheless, these studies address a specific type of state behaviour 
or a specific way of doing foreign policy that has distinct and identifiable characteristics. 
In order to gather more systematic information on how reluctance is understood in the 
field of IR, I have carried out a qualitative content analysis of selected studies that promi-
nently use this term, proceeding inductively, that is, approaching the text corpus without 
a predefined set of categories. I have explicitly avoided building my text corpus on works 
that just refer to the reluctance of rising powers in order to exclude circular reasoning 
while applying the concept of reluctance to the same group of states — rising powers 
— in later sections of this study. Most works in the field of IR that explicitly address 
‘reluctance’ refer to the US or other great powers, probably because of the puzzling and 
paradoxical coexistence of resource abundance or ‘hegemony’ with hesitant foreign poli-
cies and responsibility shirking. However, the analysis also included works on smaller 
reluctant states (e.g. Gstöhl, 2002). The results of the analysis are displayed in Figure 1.2
Reluctance is usually associated, among other things, with a highly ambivalent atti-
tude, hesitant behaviour and a selective commitment. For example, as Fehl (2012: 10) 
highlights, a reluctant US was the main proponent of an International Trade Organization 
after the Second World War but later stopped supporting the idea; it signed most human 
rights conventions but then did not ratify them during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War 
world, according to Haass (1997), the US has become a ‘reluctant sheriff’, struggling 
with the costs of providing order and with decreasing domestic interest in and consensus 
on foreign-policy issues. This reluctance is associated with ad hoc, short-term approaches 
and with a lack of ‘clarity and soundness of purpose’ (Haass, 1997: 3).3 Schweller (2014: 
6) similarly sees a danger in the current attitude of the US, which risks becoming an 
‘elephant on the sidelines, a potential but reluctant hegemon unwilling to lead’. An anal-
ysis of Norway’s, Sweden’s and Switzerland’s approaches to European integration iden-
tifies reluctance with scepticism towards integration. A preference for more limited 
forms of integration and the adoption of hesitant policies are seen as distinctive of this 
reluctant attitude (Gstöhl, 2002: 3–4). Related to ambivalence, hesitation and selectivity 
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of commitment is a high degree of incoherence in a reluctant country’s policies — as 
Patrick (2002: 5) puts it, Washington ‘has often seemed skittish about committing itself 
to proposed international legal regimes’, for example, on the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) or on human rights conventions. Similarly, Britain in the second half of the 
19th century has been termed a ‘reluctant imperialist’, with reluctance amounting to cau-
tion and aloofness from European affairs (Lowe, 1967: 9) and, interestingly, to a certain 
‘amateurishness’ in foreign policymaking (Lowe, 1967: 13). Other elements associated 
with reluctance are an obstructionism towards others’ initiatives and a certain slowness 
in implementing policies, with delays and sometimes even the adoption of ‘time-buying’ 
tactics. For example, the US Senate during the 1990s ‘stalled, diluted, or defeated’ a 
range of multilateral initiatives in the field of control of weapons of mass destruction, 
with the most evident case being the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(Patrick, 2002: 3).
In sum, an assessment of the broader semantic field of reluctance reveals that this 
notion is related to policies that are ambivalent and, at times, even obstructionist towards 
the initiatives of others, which involve shirking responsibility, a hesitant attitude, delays 
in implementation, selectivity of commitments and incoherence.
Concept reconstruction: Related theoretical approaches
Based on the preceding assessment of the broader semantic field of reluctance, a further 
useful step in concept reconstruction consists in relating the concept to existing theoreti-
cal approaches in the field, in this case, in the subject area of IR. In particular, there are 
four notions that are explicitly or implicitly related to the concept of reluctance as it has 
developed from the analysis of the broader semantic field, and that describe different 
types of foreign policy that powerful or rising states can adopt. They are exceptionalism, 
Figure 1. Notions associated with reluctance in international politics. This figure was created 
using worditout.com.
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isolationism, under-aggression and under-balancing. Figure 2 provides an overview of 
these concepts and an illustration of how reluctance relates to them, with the dashed lines 
indicating that the concepts are not just closely interrelated, but sometimes even overlap-
ping. The four concepts, which will be discussed in greater detail in the following sec-
tions, can be ordered according to the cooperative versus conflictive nature of the 
environment, as well as to the general attitude of the actor, which can be more or less 
outward- versus inward-looking.
The concept of exceptionalism refers to a body of literature that studies the foreign 
policy of states that have a particular sense of entitlement or a perception of being excep-
tional and therefore not subject to the rules and constraints binding other states. This 
leads, on the one hand, to policies aimed at ‘liberating’ others in the name of some mes-
sianic belief or some special responsibility (Holsti, 2010) — a feature that is barely related 
to reluctance. With reference to the US, underlying this approach to exceptionalism is the 
notion that an exceptional country ‘should be exempted from the international rules that 
bind other nations’ (Halperin and Boyer, 2007: 2). On the other hand, therefore, excep-
tionalism entails efforts to achieve freedom of action by shedding the burden of coopera-
tion in multilateral institutions and regimes (Halperin and Boyer, 2007; Holsti, 2010). 
Rising powers are also frequently characterized as actors that shirk responsibilities in 
international settings, ‘want the privileges of power but are unwilling to pay for them by 
contributing to global governance’ (Schweller and Pu, 2011: 42) and are not willing to 
lead or to bear the costs of public good provision. Therefore, exceptionalism is related to 
ambivalence and a general unwillingness to commit, which are important elements gener-
ally associated with the notion of reluctance. Exceptionalism is placed on the side of 
‘outward-looking’ attitudes in Figure 2 as it refers not only to a passive and self-referential 
unwillingness to get entangled (isolationism), but also to a more general recalcitrance 
about actively promoting multilateral cooperation or collective action. The potential deci-
siveness of exceptionalist powers in bilateral settings, in turn, distinguishes exceptional-
ism from reluctance, which is usually associated with hesitant, indecisive action.
The literature on isolationism focuses on powerful countries that decide to pursue a 
‘minimalist’ foreign policy characterized by limited goals, a high degree of restraint4 and 
a limited amount of resources devoted to foreign policy (Haass, 1997: 55). Isolationism 
Figure 2. Concepts related to reluctance.
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does not only involve an unwillingness to use military force: isolationist countries prefer 
not to get engaged abroad at all, are clearly inward-looking and therefore limit the 
resources devoted to different instruments of foreign policy, including diplomacy and 
foreign aid (Haass, 1997: 57). Correspondingly, isolationism is mostly equated with a 
policy of non-entanglement and with abstention from commitments. Authors like Legro 
(2005: 51) prefer to talk about ‘separatism’, understood not as strict isolation, but as 
‘nonengagement, aloofness, and detached unilateralism’. Among the typical examples of 
isolationist countries are Japan between the 18th century and the Meiji Restoration — a 
case of strict isolationism (Haass, 1997: 128–131) — and the US between the world 
wars, which was certainly not fully isolated, but refused to get engaged abroad and was 
characterized by strong isolationist ideas that were only slowly replaced by an interna-
tionalist approach (Haass, 1997: ch. 3).5 The notion of isolationism does not exclusively 
or necessarily apply to military interventions or conflictive settings. It can also mean that 
states do not make use of cooperative opportunities. The close relationship between the 
concepts of isolationism and reluctance is highlighted, for example, by Dueck (2006: 
27), who explicitly equates a ‘preference for nonentanglement’ with reluctance. At the 
same time, there are differences between the two concepts. For example, the element of 
hesitation, which is mostly associated with reluctance, does not necessarily form part of 
an isolationist policy: consistent and resolute isolationism (Nordlinger, 1995: 9) has little 
in common with the indecisiveness that is typical of reluctance.
The literature on under-aggression or under-expansion focuses specifically on rising 
powers and tries to explain why an increase in power capabilities does not necessarily 
translate into an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy, as expected by offensive 
realism. Among the typical cases analysed is the ‘imperial understretch’ of the US after 
the Civil War, which Zakaria (1998), for example, explains with the weakness of US 
state structure. Dueck (2006: 2) relates the notion of under-expansionism to the concept 
of reluctance by asking why Americans have been ‘reluctant crusaders’: ‘crusaders in the 
promotion of a more liberal international order’ but ‘reluctant to admit the full costs of 
promoting this liberal international vision’. Recently, Meiser (2015) has added to the 
literature on US under-expansionism (or, in his words, restraint) by focusing, again, on 
why the rising US did not expand territorially between 1898 and 1941, with his explana-
tion mostly focusing on domestic institutions and the path-dependency effects of restraint. 
Among the authors who look beyond the case of the US is Schweller, who investigates 
what he calls ‘the suboptimal reluctance to use force or to build up military power’ 
(Schweller, 2006: 105) on the part of most great powers in the 20th century. His conten-
tious conclusion is that only fascist regimes could develop the ‘“ideologized” power 
politics for mass consumption’ (Schweller, 2006: 21) that are required for expansionism 
in the modern world and involve a substantial mobilization of the population. The notions 
of under-aggression and under-expansion therefore refer to policies of countries that are 
not necessarily inward-looking, but for different reasons do not realize their outward-
looking potential in military terms. These notions relate to reluctance, but with a specific 
reference to conflictive policies, thereby excluding the more subtle nuances mostly asso-
ciated with the concept of reluctance, which involves a whole array of indecisive, hesi-
tant, flip-flopping policies. While most approaches explain under-aggression as an 
‘unwillingness’ to expand, some also take into account the ‘inability’ or, more generally, 
Destradi 323
the constraints faced by powerful countries. Among the main limitations of approaches 
that focus on under-aggression or restraint is that they necessarily have to work with 
counterfactuals to explain why something that would have been expected has not taken 
place (see, e.g., Meiser, 2015). By contrast, the notion of reluctance, if appropriately 
conceptualized and operationalized, refers to actual foreign policy.
Finally, a related notion is that of under-balancing: the attitude of countries that do 
not respond to threats in conflictive settings by mobilizing military power or by forging 
alliances (Schweller, 2006). Unlike under-aggression, this concept does not focus on a 
lack of initiative or on why states are ‘timid’ (Schweller, 2006: 20). Instead, it focuses on 
why states do not react to dangerous aggressors or to dangerous changes in relative 
power as expected by balance-of-power theory. It refers, therefore, to inward-looking 
policies, as outlined in Figure 2. Among the four concepts, under-balancing is probably 
most closely associated with reluctance. As Schweller (2006: 63) explicitly acknowl-
edges it can take the form of ‘half measures, muddling through, and incoherent grand 
strategies’ and thus reflects the incoherence and ambivalence that is frequently associ-
ated with reluctance. However, under-balancing addresses only a very specific context 
for reluctant behaviour, namely, the situation of being threatened by another country — a 
situation in which reluctance is a ‘mistake’ (Schweller, 2006: 10) that potentially affects 
a state’s survival. Therefore, it does not refer to a broader spectrum of foreign-policy 
contexts and situations that go beyond the particular setting of being threatened. 
Moreover, focusing on under-balancing as a ‘mistake’ ignores cases in which buying 
time, preferring not to commit too heavily or shirking responsibility might be adequate 
ways of dealing with different types of pressure and expectations.
The concept of reluctance therefore touches upon each of the four concepts discussed 
earlier and yet differs from them in important respects. Each of them is ‘a generalizable 
behaviour, as opposed to a unique or individual occurrence, that shares certain distin-
guishing features, such that it forms a class of historical cases’ (Schweller, 2006: 16). The 
same holds for reluctance. What the four concepts of exceptionalism, isolationism, under-
aggression and under-balancing share is the diffuse notion of not doing something that 
might be appropriate — of being forms of behaviour that do not conform to certain expec-
tations. This notion of not fulfilling the expectations of others is an important element 
associated with reluctance. Expectations might either involve calls to adopt a different 
policy or exhortations to stop implementing certain policies, and both can be met with 
recalcitrance. At the same time, the concept of reluctance stands between exceptionalism, 
isolationism, under-aggression and under-balancing since it can refer to both inward- and 
outward-looking actors in both cooperative and conflictive settings. This implies that 
reluctance is not limited to one specific policy field. The question ‘Reluctance to do 
what?’ can therefore be answered in very different ways. Reluctance itself does not neces-
sarily just refer to an unwillingness to lead or to pursue hegemonic policies, as suggested 
by studies that resort to notions like ‘reluctant hegemony’. Furthermore, it is not necessar-
ily just ‘reluctance to do something’, but can also refer to a hesitant and recalcitrant 
approach with regard to not doing something or discontinuing existing policies. Reluctance 
therefore rather constitutes a peculiar type or style of foreign policy that can be found 
across issue areas and settings. We therefore need a better understanding of reluctance as 
a concept that refers to a distinct set of phenomena.
324 European Journal of International Relations 23(2)
Reluctance: Concept building
The previous identification of the broader semantic field of reluctance in IR and our discus-
sion of related theoretical approaches has allowed us to obtain some insights into the ‘back-
ground concept’ (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 531) of reluctance. This is a useful starting 
point: ‘concept reconstruction is a means whose ultimate purpose is to provide a cleaned-
up basis for construction — that is, for the formation of concepts’ (Sartori, 1984: 50, 
emphasis in original). In other words, concept reconstruction helps us to grasp ‘what is 
important about an entity’ (Goertz, 2006: 27). On this basis, we can now proceed with 
concept building, and, to that end, we will follow the guidelines proposed by Goertz (2006) 
as this work provides important ideas on how to think about the structure of concepts.
The negative poles
The first step in concept building consists in identifying the ‘basic level’ of a concept, 
that is, the concept ‘as used in theoretical propositions’ (Goertz, 2006: 6). In our case, the 
basic-level concept is reluctance. A useful way to sharpen our understanding of a basic-
level concept entails thinking explicitly about the negative pole of that concept, that is, 
about what the concept is not. For the case of reluctance, there is not a single obvious 
negative pole. Within the broader idea of ‘non-reluctance’, however, we can think of two 
dimensions that constitute the opposite of reluctance on two different continuums: (1) 
determination; and (2) being responsive to demands made by others. Determination 
amounts to a resolute, decisive and consistent attitude, which involves the ability to 
make decisions without displaying much hesitation. The concept of determination there-
fore encompasses the opposite of the ambivalence, incoherence, hesitancy and slowness 
that characterize reluctance. By responsiveness to others’ demands, I understand reacting 
readily and sympathetically to appeals and requests by other actors, particularly by less 
powerful actors in a hierarchical setting like that existing between rising powers and 
smaller neighbouring states. Potential followers can ask the rising power to participate in 
common initiatives, to deliver public goods, to support a certain cause, to act in a less 
intrusive manner and many other things. A country that is responsive to such demands 
will not shirk responsibility, will not be unwilling to commit fully and will not display an 
obstructionist attitude towards the demands made by others — in other words, a respon-
sive country will not be reluctant.
Determination and responsiveness therefore constitute different dimensions of the 
negative pole of reluctance. They can help us to clarify the actual ‘constitutive’ or ‘sec-
ondary-level’ dimensions of the concept of reluctance.6
Constitutive dimensions and concept structure
As illustrated in Figure 3, reluctance has two constitutive dimensions: hesitation and 
recalcitrance. These dimensions are ‘constitutive’ in the sense that they tell us what the 
basic-level concept of reluctance consists of: ‘Concepts are theories about ontology: they 
are theories about the fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon’ (Goertz, 
2006: 5). As such, concepts are not just important as constructs that help us to grasp 
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empirical reality, but they also have an impact on theorizing and hypothesis testing. As a 
consequence, concepts and the ways in which they are constructed have huge implica-
tions for all the successive phases of a research project (think of the implications of 
conceptualization for case selection); elements of causality are often inherent in con-
cepts, and need to be appropriately acknowledged.
Along a continuum entailing different degrees of resolve in an actor’s behaviour, hesi-
tation is the polar opposite of determination. It involves an ambivalent, incoherent atti-
tude. Reluctance is therefore much more than just under-aggression or under-expansionism. 
Nor does reluctance necessarily amount to the adoption of a ‘hands-off’ policy, that is, to 
inactivity. A consistent refusal to get involved in a military dispute, for example, is not 
reluctant behaviour understood as hesitation since it actually amounts to a clear and 
coherent policy course. For example, the fact that Japan and Germany were for several 
decades ‘reluctant to resort to the use of military force’ (Berger, 1996: 318) does not 
amount to reluctance as hesitation as understood in this study since their attitude was 
coherent. If, however, we observe contrasting and incoherent statements on the need to 
become active, or possibly even some engagement followed by backtracking, this will 
amount to reluctance.
Recalcitrance is the second core dimension of reluctance, and it is the opposite of 
being responsive to others’ demands — along a continuum referring to the degree of 
openness towards the wishes of others, especially of potential followers. It involves 
opposing the wishes articulated by others. For example, Fehl (2012: 4) highlights that the 
US displayed a ‘scepticism or outright opposition to multilateral treaty initiatives strongly 
Figure 3. Negative poles and secondary/constitutive dimensions of reluctance.
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favoured by European states’. The latter demanded a stronger commitment on the part of 
Washington, which, however, was recalcitrant — that is, unresponsive to the demands 
articulated by its European partners.
An essential step in building concepts is the clarification and discussion of their struc-
ture, which has huge consequences for their extension and intension (Sartori, 1970). In 
fact, depending on whether one adopts a necessary-and-sufficient-conditions structure or 
a ‘family resemblance’ structure that does not entail any necessary conditions (Goertz, 
2006: 35–46), the number of secondary dimensions will have an impact on the categories 
of phenomena that are covered by the concept. The concept of reluctance as developed 
in this article follows a traditional necessary-and-sufficient-conditions structure: the two 
secondary dimensions of hesitation and recalcitrance are necessary and jointly sufficient 
to define reluctance — and are therefore connected by the logical operator AND. A fam-
ily resemblance structure is not suitable for a conceptualization of reluctance since it 
implies that all conditions are sufficient, but that none is necessary. Adopting such a 
structure would have meant connecting hesitation and recalcitrance with the logical 
operator OR and arguing that either hesitation or recalcitrance would be sufficient for 
characterizing foreign policy as ‘reluctant’. However, in that case, the concept’s exten-
sion would grow indefinitely since recalcitrance — a lack of responsiveness to the 
demands made by others — is an almost omnipresent feature of foreign policy: states are 
continually confronted with expectations articulated by very different actors, be they 
other countries, international organizations, transnational non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), their own public or other domestic actors. As these expectations and pres-
sures will, in most cases, be contradictory, given the very different structural positions 
and interests of the actors articulating them, any foreign-policy decision will invariably 
ignore or reject the demands made by some of these actors. Therefore, if recalcitrance 
were a sufficient condition to conceptualize reluctance, any foreign-policy decision 
could be considered ‘reluctant’ and the concept itself would take a very different con-
notation as compared to its usage identified through concept reconstruction. Recalcitrance 
alone cannot therefore count as a sufficient condition to define reluctance: it needs to be 
paired with hesitation. Similarly, hesitation itself is not identical with reluctance because 
it does not automatically entail a lack of responsiveness vis-a-vis the expectations articu-
lated by others — even though incoherent and contradictory statements and policies will 
usually disappoint at least some expectations. By conceptualizing foreign-policy reluc-
tance as constituted by the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of hesitation and 
recalcitrance, we avoid the ambiguities inherent in much of the literature, which amplify 
the concept’s extension by treating reluctance in a loose and unspecified manner.
These thoughts on the concept structure of reluctance have theoretical implications. 
For example, the inclusion of recalcitrance in the concept will have an impact on the 
development of a theory of reluctance in international politics. The simple observation of 
an indecisive, flip-flopping foreign policy on the part of a government could, in princi-
ple, be easily termed ‘reluctance’, but the inclusion of the element of recalcitrance, with 
its refusal to conform to the expectations of other actors, has important consequences. If 
we focus on the reluctance displayed by rising powers in their own regions and if we take 
the foreign policy of these countries as an independent variable to explain, for example, 
variations in regional cooperation, then recalcitrance matters. In fact, a recalcitrant atti-
tude vis-a-vis the wishes articulated by smaller regional countries will most likely lead 
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to disillusionment and disaffection among them, and thus contribute to hampering 
regional cooperation. For example, India has long been recalcitrant in its approach to its 
smaller neighbours in South Asia, refusing to make concessions on matters like trade. 
This has fuelled the suspicions of small countries of New Delhi and has induced them to 
see China as an attractive alternative partner — with disastrous consequences for regional 
cooperation in South Asia (Destradi, 2012). On a different note, if we take reluctance as 
a dependent variable, we might hypothesize that it can emerge as a consequence of the 
effort to manage competing expectations articulated by different actors at different levels 
of analysis — be they great powers at the global level, neighbouring states or domestic 
actors. Recalcitrance, understood as an unwillingness or impossibility to respond to all 
of these expectations, would then reflect the dilemma of states in which different domes-
tic actors have different priorities, also concerning the accommodation of external actors’ 
expectations. Reluctance might therefore be considered an outcome of the political pro-
cess of accommodating and mediating between different expectations.
Operationalization
The third level of concepts is constituted by indicators to be applied in the analysis of 
empirical phenomena. An operationalization of reluctance in terms of hesitation and recal-
citrance has the advantage of allowing us to avoid counterfactual arguments like those used 
in publications that refer to the untapped leadership potential of ‘reluctant’ powers (see, 
e.g., publications on Germany as a reluctant hegemon or, more generally, on Germany’s 
role in the Eurozone crisis (e.g. Jones, 2010: 26; The Economist, 2013)). In fact, those 
usages of the term ‘reluctance’ imply that something has not been done — for example, that 
Germany has not taken over a leadership role in Europe. Like the aforementioned studies 
on ‘under-aggression’, which use counterfactuals to explain why something that would 
have been expected (‘aggression’) has not taken place (Meiser, 2015), most works that 
refer to ‘reluctance’ vaguely associate this notion with a lack of leadership or of purpose. 
From such a perspective, reluctance would need to be thought of in terms of a counterfac-
tual, that is, of what would have happened if an actor had not been reluctant — an approach 
that, of course, bears analytical difficulties. By contrast, this article develops indicators of 
hesitation and recalcitrance that refer to observable foreign-policy behaviour and to expec-
tations explicitly articulated by other actors. Thereby, these indicators allow us to identify 
reluctance on the basis of actual foreign policy and to avoid counterfactual reasoning.7
Hesitation can be identified by the following indicators:
•• Lack of initiative: with a particular focus on powerful countries such as rising pow-
ers, this indicator implies that smaller states develop and implement suggestions 
and solutions on a specific issue or crisis that is relevant not just to them, but also 
to the rising power. The powerful actor, therefore, free-rides on that initiative by 
not contributing resources proportionate to its weight and does not come up with 
its own policies and solutions. This indicator of hesitation refers to a passive policy 
as a powerful country stands on the sidelines and lets other actors take the lead.
•• Delaying: hesitation can take a more explicit form if the dominant country buys 
time and does not stick to a previously agreed time frame, thereby postponing 
important decisions in dealing with a specific issue or crisis.8
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•• Flip-flopping in statements and/or policies: this is the most evident form of hesita-
tion. It can be observed if the statements on a specific issue made by members of 
the executive or other official government representatives are not consistent over 
time, but change frequently or suddenly, or if policies on that issue are not coher-
ent, but keep changing rapidly.9 Flip-flopping is also associated with contradic-
tions in statements or policies among different representatives of the same 
government on a specific issue.
Recalcitrance, which is a lack of responsiveness towards the demands made by others, 
can be assessed through the following indicators:
•• Ignoring requests made by others: the government of the dominant country does 
not react to calls made by other actors and its policies do not reflect the prefer-
ences articulated by them.
•• Rejecting requests: the government of the dominant country explicitly refuses to 
comply with the wishes articulated by other actors.
•• Obstructing others’ initiatives: the government of the dominant country hampers 
others’ activities. This does not necessarily happen through an explicit veto or 
other formal procedures, but can take place informally, for example, in the context 
of multilateral decision-making processes in which smaller countries will tend to 
conform to the preferences of a powerful actor.
Among the indicators of both hesitation and recalcitrance (see Figure 4), there is a logi-
cal OR, which implies that for each dimension, it is sufficient to observe at least one of 
the three indicators in order to classify foreign policy as hesitant or recalcitrant, but that 
more than one indicator can be observed at the same time. For example, a hesitant coun-
try can both display a lack of initiative in the management of serious crises and, at the 
same time, delay initiatives proposed by others. Similarly, a recalcitrant country can both 
ignore requests made by others and, at the same time, hamper their initiatives.
Importantly, both hesitation and recalcitrance can occur to different degrees, implying 
that each of these dimensions entails a continuum. In his work on social science con-
cepts, Goertz (2006: 34) highlights the usefulness of treating ‘all concepts as continu-
ous’.10 This allows us to reduce measurement error by acknowledging that particular 
cases can lie at the weaker or the stronger end of a conceptual continuum; it thereby also 
helps to avoid theorizing on the basis of very special cases (Goertz, 2006). Relatedly, 
Goertz (2006) argues in favour of an ontology that explicitly acknowledges ‘borderline 
cases’ or ‘grey zones’. Grey zones include cases at the fuzzy border between positive 
cases, which correspond to a certain concept (in our study, cases of reluctance), and 
negative cases (in our study, cases of non-reluctance). Often, grey zones involve ‘transi-
tions’: for example, Goertz (2006) mentions democratic transition as a typical grey zone 
between democracy and autocracy. The existence of such grey zones needs to be ‘openly 
confront[ed]’ (Goertz and Mazur, 2008: 30) since it has huge implications for both meas-
urement and case selection.11 In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the notions of a 
continuous concept and of grey zones with reference to reluctance.
The concept of reluctance is continuous since both its secondary dimensions — 
hesitation and recalcitrance — can occur to different degrees. The indicators of 
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recalcitrance are arrayed along a continuum ranging from a mere ignoring of requests to 
the rejection of requests and the active obstructionism of initiatives promoted by other 
actors. Depending on the combination of these indicators, on the frequency with which 
they appear and on the salience of the issues on which a state is recalcitrant, we can clas-
sify recalcitrance as low, medium or high, with an appropriate weighting to be applied in 
specific empirical analyses. The same is true for hesitation, where a lack of initiative is a 
less explicit form of hesitation as compared to the delaying of decisions, while flip-
flopping is the most evident type of hesitant behaviour. These different intensities and the 
possible different combinations of lack of initiative, delaying and flip-flopping can there-
fore lead to varying degrees of hesitation (see Figure 5). For example, a country whose 
foreign policy is strongly flip-flopping in crucial decision processes will obviously count 
as more reluctant than a country whose foreign policy displays little flip-flopping and 
strong initiatives, but some delays in the implementation of policies. As illustrated in 
Figure 5, the combination of indicators of hesitation and recalcitrance leads to the iden-
tification of different degrees of reluctant behaviour. This more fine-grained assessment 
of reluctance, which goes beyond a mere dichotomous understanding of the concept, can 
prove helpful in the assessment of variation in foreign-policy reluctance. Moreover, it 
will prove useful in tracing processes of policy change by highlighting shifts in the inten-
sity of reluctance.
Table 1 also highlights that hesitation and recalcitrance are both necessary conditions 
for reluctance. That is, a recalcitrant but determined (non-hesitant) attitude — for example, 
Figure 4. The concept structure of reluctance.
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a coherent refusal to comply with smaller regional countries’ wishes — would not amount 
to reluctance. Similarly, a hesitant but responsive attitude would not correspond to reluc-
tance: while it might be hard for an actor to be fully responsive while pursuing an entirely 
incoherent, flip-flopping policy, a delayed reaction to the wishes of others or conforming to 
their wishes while not developing initiatives would not qualify as reluctance.
The ‘grey zones’ of reluctance include cases of transition between reluctant and 
non-reluctant policies. Two interesting grey zones emerge at the upper end of the con-
tinuum, that is, in cases of extreme recalcitrance or hesitation. If an actor is hesitant 
and extremely recalcitrant, this recalcitrance might become so strong as to prevail over 
hesitation: the blocking of others’ initiatives will become more and more determined, 
up to the point of leaving hesitation behind and becoming a coherent and consistent 
policy. Similarly, if recalcitrance is combined with extreme hesitation, we have another 
‘grey zone’: indecisiveness can be so strong that the reluctant actor becomes unable to 
make a choice and gets temporarily ‘paralysed’. The transition towards non-reluctance 
will be completed when the paralysis turns into consistent inaction since that very 
inaction would amount to a determined attitude. An empirical illustration of one of the 
grey zones will be provided later in the discussion of the European Union’s (EU’s) 
approach to the Libya crisis in 2011. Another particular set of cases are those in which 
an actor is both highly recalcitrant (i.e. rather openly hampering the initiatives pro-
moted by others) and, at the same time, highly hesitant. In this case, we can expect the 
two dimensions of hesitation and recalcitrance to partially offset each other, so that the 
outcome will be a comparatively more moderate form of reluctance (as illustrated in 
the bottom right field in Figure 5).
An application: Reluctant rising powers?
As was mentioned in the introductory section, reluctance is frequently associated with 
the foreign-policy attitude of rising powers, but this term is often used in a rather loose 
Figure 5. Intensity of reluctance.
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and unspecified manner. An application of the concept of reluctance developed in this 
article can provide some clarity. Rising powers can be defined as countries that display 
‘expanding economic prowess, a high degree of political power and military potential 
and the capability to play an influential role in global politics’ (Cooper and Flemes, 2013: 
946).12 While most authors agree on considering China, India, Brazil and South Africa as 
rising powers, developments like the growing international visibility of Germany or the 
declining economic growth of Brazil remind us that membership in the club of rising 
powers can change. Russia, while being a member of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa), does not fulfil some of the criteria mentioned earlier, particu-
larly the one on expanding economic prowess, and should therefore be considered an 
‘outlier’ (Hurrell, 2006: 2) and a declining power (Cooper and Flemes, 2013: 945).
In the following sections, I will proceed by looking at the different combinations of 
the two constitutive dimensions of reluctance and their different intensities, as illustrated 
in Figure 5. The selection of cases is driven by illustration purposes.
First of all, if a foreign policy displays both determination and responsiveness, it will 
not be reluctant. Among rising powers, the one that has generally been closest to non-
reluctance in dealing with its region is Brazil. Since the late 1990s and up to the ‘Lula’ 
da Silva presidency, Brazil had developed a proactive and constructive approach towards 
South America. During those years, the Brazilian government dealt with some of the 
most serious regional crises: in a rather decisive manner, it prevented coups in Paraguay 
(1997) and Venezuela (2002), it mediated in the territorial dispute between Ecuador and 
Peru (1995–1998), and it led the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
(Spektor, 2010: 193). In the field of security, therefore, Brazil took the initiative, did not 
delay and was coherent in its policies. At the same time, it was mostly responsive to the 
demands of fellow South American countries, even though suspicions towards Brazil’s 
ambitious discourse of ‘non-indifference’ (Spektor, 2010: 194) towards the region 
remained in place among Brazil’s neighbours (Malamud, 2011). By contrast, when it 
comes to the promotion of regional integration, Brazil displayed a certain degree of 
recalcitrance as it ‘responded only selectively to calls for deepening regional institutions’ 
(Spektor, 2010: 195). While Brazil was the driving force in the creation of MERCOSUR 
and of what later became the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), during 
Lula’s second presidential term and under Dilma Rousseff, its approach became more 
hesitant. Some degree of flip-flopping was revealed by Brazil’s ‘simultaneous rhetoric of 
solidarity and unwillingness to build robust regional multilateral institutions’ (Burges, 
2015: 195) and by a coexistence of a cooperative and multilateralist rhetoric and an 
increasing assertiveness and preference for bilateralism (Burges, 2015: 201–102). The 
case of Brazil, which in the 1990s–2000s was not reluctant on security issues but has 
displayed an increasing reluctance in the field of regional integration in recent years, 
reveals possible discrepancies in reluctance across issue areas.
A historical comparison with Brazil’s policies in the 1960s and 1970s, in turn, pro-
vides an interesting contrast and an illustration of policies that are recalcitrant but not 
hesitant — and therefore non-reluctant. After the military coup of 1964, Brazil was not 
at all responsive towards the expectations of smaller Latin American countries. It pur-
sued, instead, a rather intrusive policy in the region, for example, by intervening in 
support of a coup that brought to power a Brazil-friendly government in Bolivia in 
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1971, or by letting its secret services carry out ‘anti-subversive activities’ on Uruguayan 
territory (Hurrell, 1992: 42). While some elements of incoherence were in place — for 
example, the mixing of an aggressive ‘talk of “moving frontiers” and historical mis-
sions to regional predominance’, with a parallel rhetoric on the ‘need for Latin American 
unity’ (Hurrell, 1992: 27) — Brazil’s approach to the region during the 1960s–1970s 
was overall certainly not hesitant, and therefore not reluctant, but rather openly 
assertive.
Importantly, policies that are recalcitrant but not hesitant will not necessarily always 
be dominating and intrusive, like those of Brazil in the 1960s–1970s — they might also 
be the exact contrary. The previously mentioned cases of Japan and Germany, which 
consistently refused to resort to military power during the decades after the Second 
World War, are examples of a coherent, not hesitant — but, at the same time, recalcitrant 
— approach in the field of security.
The ‘grey zones’ of reluctance need to be interpreted particularly carefully. As was 
mentioned earlier, policies that are moderately recalcitrant but extremely hesitant 
belong to the grey zone if hesitation leads to paralysis, and they can shift to non-reluc-
tance if inaction becomes consistent. The case of the EU, which can be considered a 
peculiar emerging actor, and its approach to the Libya crisis of 2011 provides a good 
illustration. In fact, the EU was extremely hesitant in its approach to the crisis. Long 
after the beginning of military operations by French, US, British and other forces, and 
‘[w]ith [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s [NATO’s]] “Operation Unified 
Protector” well under way, the EU continued its debate as to whether it would have any 
military role in the conflict’ (Engberg, 2014: 159). It took the European Council three 
weeks to decide that it would establish a humanitarian mission to Libya, and the actual 
existence of that mission was made conditional upon a request by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Koenig, 2014: 259). As no such request 
was ever made, the EU mission, which had been prematurely called ‘EUFOR Libya’, 
never came into existence. The EU’s strong hesitation (lack of initiative and flip-flopping 
in the form of half-hearted measures combined with rhetorical condemnation)13 was 
paired with a lack of full responsiveness to ‘internal and external demands for [it] to act 
as a “comprehensive power”’ (Koenig, 2014: 251), mainly due to the divergences among 
the interests of some member states and European institutions (Engberg, 2014: 160–
161; Koenig, 2014: 260–264). We can interpret the EU’s policies and its inability to 
make a decision on the establishment of a CSDP (Common Security and Defence 
Policy) mission as extreme hesitation and almost paralysis — a ‘grey zone’ given the 
potential for a transition from reluctance to consistent (and non-reluctant) rejection of 
any kind of engagement. Ultimately, however, the EU’s policies shifted back from the 
grey zone to reluctance: hesitation was not so extreme as to lead to complete inaction 
since a decision on the mission was eventually made; moreover, the fact that EUFOR 
Libya never came into existence was ultimately due not to the EU’s inaction, but to the 
lack of a request by OCHA.
If we move on to typical cases of reluctance, which do not involve the extremes of the 
continuum or grey zones, we will find a combination of both hesitation and recalci-
trance. A good illustration is provided by India’s approach to crisis management in South 
Asia, which since the 1990s has been particularly reluctant. In post-2001 Afghanistan, 
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for example, New Delhi has been highly engaged as a donor, but it has been hesitant on 
matters of security, despite the potentially detrimental consequences of a further destabi-
lization of Afghanistan for India’s own security. India delayed and watered down the 
implementation of a strategic partnership agreement signed with Afghanistan in 2011 
(Destradi, 2014: 569–570). On the issue of weapons provision to the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), New Delhi has been flip-flopping, initially refusing to help, 
later agreeing to supply some Indian-made light helicopters and logistics equipment, 
subsequently agreeing to provide weapons, but ultimately choosing to pay for Russian 
weapons deliveries (Miglani, 2014). India’s recalcitrance becomes evident as New Delhi 
repeatedly refused to comply with the Afghan government’s wishes for more support, 
thereby disappointing Afghan policymakers and observers (Destradi, 2014: 570).
A further useful illustrative case of reluctance is that of Germany in the Eurozone crisis 
— a case in which the notion of reluctance has been used to describe Germany’s attitude 
(Paterson, 2011; The Economist, 2013), but without an extensive discussion of what the 
term entails. The focus on the two constitutive dimensions of reluctance — hesitation and 
recalcitrance — allows us to notice some important shifts in Germany’s approach to the 
crisis over time. In fact, recalcitrance was in place throughout the whole crisis, from its 
very beginning in autumn 2009, when the German government labelled the crisis a Greek 
problem and refused to help, through to rejecting all the subsequent requests for help. This 
does not imply that Berlin stood aloof and ignored all requests since it was heavily 
involved in crisis management throughout, but it kept rejecting those demands and pro-
posals that contradicted its preferences. Germany’s recalcitrance on Eurobonds, for exam-
ple, remained in place over time, even though it was articulated in an increasingly harsh 
tone (Spiegel Online, 2012). By contrast, when it comes to hesitation, we can observe an 
interesting shift in Berlin’s approach. At the beginning of the crisis, the German govern-
ment was highly hesitant: it did not take the initiative in crisis management; it delayed its 
responses to the crisis — among other reasons, in order not to alienate voters ahead of 
local elections in North-Rhine Westphalia in May 2010 (Schild, 2013: 28); and its 
approach was full of contradictions (flip-flopping). For example, Berlin had to backtrack 
on previous reassurances that it would not commit itself too heavily, and the contradictory 
statements issued by Finance Minister Schäuble and Chancellor Merkel in the early stages 
of the crisis gave ‘the impression that in Berlin the right hand didn’t know what the left 
was doing’ (Feldenkirchen et al., 2010: 22). Over time, however, German hesitation dis-
appeared as Berlin took the initiative more openly, while delaying and flip-flopping 
diminished. Germany started promoting a policy of austerity in much more assertive and 
consistent terms, and with the European Council meeting of 8–9 December 2011 and the 
introduction of the Fiscal Compact (Schild, 2013: 37), German hesitation (and thereby its 
reluctance) had definitely disappeared.
In a contrary development, Brazil, which was not reluctant on matters of security and 
crisis management during the 1990s–2000s, has become increasingly passive and reluc-
tant in recent years. Brazil’s new reluctance is exemplified by its approach to the crisis 
that shook Venezuela in 2014. While the government of Nicolás Maduro cracked down 
heavily on protesters, Brazil did not take any initiatives beyond participating in a failed 
mediation effort by UNASUR and was ‘characteristically mute’ (The Economist, 2014). 
Brazil’s hesitation was paired with recalcitrance about getting engaged more actively and 
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was met with disillusionments among South American states that had hoped for more 
than some ‘bland’ communiqués on the part of Brasilia (Stünkel, 2014).
Conclusion
This article has aimed to develop a conceptualization of reluctance in international poli-
tics. The conceptualization built upon: (1) existing uses of the concept in the literature 
in order to identify the broad semantic field to which it relates; and (2) the concept’s 
relationship to similar terms in the academic debate. Based on this concept reconstruc-
tion, reluctance was characterized as entailing the two constitutive dimensions of hesi-
tation and recalcitrance. Corresponding indicators for empirical analyses were identified 
and the concept structure was outlined. The discussion of exceptionalism, isolationism, 
under-aggression and under-balancing has shown that the field of IR offers a range of 
conceptual tools related to reluctance, but that none of them is able to capture the 
essence of reluctance. The introduction of reluctance to the conceptual lexicon of IR has 
a value added in that it allows us to capture a particular way or style of foreign policy 
— one entailing hesitation and, at the same time, a recalcitrant attitude vis-a-vis the 
expectations articulated by others. This specific type of foreign policy seems to be 
rather widespread, but IR has so far failed to acknowledge its existence, usually assum-
ing that states follow a clear and consistent foreign-policy path — or highlighting very 
specific forms of deviation from expected behaviour (as with under-aggression or 
under-balancing). The application of the concept of reluctance to different cases of ris-
ing powers has provided a first illustration of the usefulness of this concept: it allows us 
to analytically grasp a set of policies that are frequently mentioned in political com-
mentary but never rigorously assessed. For example, a thorough assessment of specific 
indicators of hesitation and recalcitrance allows us to trace subtle changes in a country’s 
reluctance over time: in 2013, it did not make much sense anymore to consider Germany 
a reluctant power (The Economist, 2013) as, by that time, the German government had 
consolidated its position on the Eurozone crisis and had started acting in an openly 
assertive manner. The conceptualization of reluctance therefore fills a gap in the IR lit-
erature by giving us the analytical tools necessary to study a widespread type of foreign 
policy and by laying the groundwork for more extensive studies on reluctance, its deter-
minants and its consequences.
The discussion of illustrative negative cases, in which only one of the secondary 
dimensions of reluctance was in place, has shown that both hesitation and recalcitrance 
are necessary conditions for a foreign policy to be considered reluctant. The case of Brazil, 
which in the 1990s–2000s was reluctant on regional integration but not on security mat-
ters, reveals that reluctance (or the degree thereof) can vary across issue areas. The notion 
of reluctance is therefore not tied to a specific policy field and does not necessarily just 
refer to an unwillingness to lead or to provide public goods, as is sometimes assumed in 
the literature on ‘reluctant hegemons’. Rather, reluctance is a more general approach to 
policymaking that can be identified across policy fields, periods of time and world regions.
Based on these insights, further research will need to study the determinants of reluc-
tant foreign policy. In other words, why are rising powers reluctant and how can we 
explain variations in reluctance? Is this a phenomenon specifically related to rising 
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powers and possibly associated to the difficulties and adjustment processes that these 
countries might face while suddenly getting more powerful? Furthermore, related to 
these points: how can we explain changes and shifts in the intensity of reluctance or 
between reluctance and non-reluctance? The assessment of the German case has revealed 
that as Berlin increasingly consolidated its position on the Eurozone crisis, it became less 
and less reluctant. Interestingly, this new determination could later also be observed in 
the field of security, with Germany’s proactive role in the management of the Ukraine 
crisis during 2014–2015. Similarly, India’s foreign policy under the government of Prime 
Minister Modi has arguably become less reluctant (Mohan, 2015). The contrast between 
the decreasing reluctance of India and Germany and the increasing reluctance of Brazil 
seems to suggest that reluctance might be a typical feature of rising powers’ foreign 
policy, which is left aside as countries get more powerful or are increasingly perceived 
as being more powerful, but that reluctance might re-emerge in the case of domestic 
instability like the one plaguing Brazil in recent years. More detailed assessments of the 
drivers of change in reluctant foreign policy, as well as of the relationship between ‘rise’ 
and reluctance, will be important areas of further research. Future studies would also 
need to include current and historical cases of declining powers. For example, an analy-
sis of the recent non-reluctant policies of Russia would be useful for reaching more 
general conclusions about the rise and fall trajectories of great powers.
Moreover, the question emerges of what the broader potential impact of rising pow-
ers’ reluctant policies is. In fact, these countries’ reluctance does not seem to be confined 
to the management of regional crises like those discussed earlier. Reluctance is arguably 
also a core feature in rising powers’ approaches to broader processes of global govern-
ance. Several of these countries have repeatedly shown a lack of responsiveness vis-a-vis 
established powers’ requests for specific contributions to global governance, for exam-
ple, on binding emission targets in global climate governance. However, they have not 
entirely opted out from global-governance mechanisms and institutions, but rather com-
bined their recalcitrance with some degree of hesitation on how to contribute to the 
maintenance of international order. The concept of reluctance can therefore provide a 
useful analytical angle to scholars who try to make sense of broader processes of the 
allocation of responsibilities between established and emerging powers. While ‘reluctant 
guardians’ (Bunde and Oroz, 2015) might be contributing to a disruption of international 
order, more work is needed on whether the consequences of reluctance are, indeed, dis-
ruptive for global governance and on what policies might be needed to cope with reluc-
tance and to address the concerns of reluctant rising powers.
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Notes
 1. While Sartori clearly displays a greater interest in semantics as compared to other authors, as 
is revealed by his somewhat confusing discussion, for example, of the impact of translations 
(Goertz, 2006: 3), he clearly distinguishes between concepts and the words chosen to express 
them (Sartori, 1984: 18–22).
 2. The analysis proceeded in a ‘data-driven way’, that is, by ‘letting [the] categories emerge 
from the data’ (Schreier, 2012: 25). The text corpus was analysed by looking specifically for 
expressions associated with the notion of reluctance or used to describe behaviour defined as 
‘reluctant’. This approach is suitable given the descriptive aim of the exercise (Schreier, 2012: 
43): the identification of the broader semantic field of concepts that are associated with reluc-
tance in the literature. The different aspects emerging inductively from the text were summa-
rized in categories, which are highlighted in italics in this article: ambivalent attitude, hesitant 
behaviour, selective commitment, incoherence, obstructionism towards others’ initiatives and 
slowness. Figure 1 visualizes the relationship between more specific aspects, such as ‘decline 
financial contributions’ or ‘incomplete implementation’, and the inductively elaborated cat-
egories, which are visualized in bigger characters as emerging out of the concept cloud.
 3. On a rather different note, Ikenberry (1998/1999: 63) argues that the US acted as a ‘reluctant 
superpower’ in the post-war period since ‘it was not eager to actively organize and run’ the 
international order that it had created. While this underscores the selectivity of commitment 
highlighted by other authors, Ikenberry interestingly argues that this reluctance had a reassur-
ing effect on other states.
 4. A separate, but mostly prescriptive, strand in the literature on US foreign policy revolves 
around the notion of restraint (or self-restraint), understood as a moderate and subtle policy 
focused on few threats and thereby opposed to ‘expansiveness’ (Posen, 2014: xiii) and inter-
ested, instead, in reassuring others about one’s benign intentions (e.g. Ikenberry, 1998/1999). 
While the concept of restraint is clearly related to the four concepts discussed here, it is 
conceptualized as a straightforward policy that does not entail the elements of hesitation and 
recalcitrance typical of reluctance.
 5. At the same time, isolationism is closely related to and sometimes equated with exceptional-
ism. As was mentioned earlier, the borders between the four concepts are blurred and these 
notions are sometimes overlapping.
 6. Goertz (2006: 35) argues that the secondary-level dimensions of a concept will ‘almost always 
refer to the positive concept’ and that only in a second step will we have to think about the 
negative pole of each secondary-level dimension. In this case, however, I proceeded inversely 
by first thinking about what the constitutive dimensions of reluctance are not before moving 
on to define them. This approach is extremely helpful in order to clarify the secondary dimen-
sions themselves.
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 7. Specific thresholds can be set in single empirical studies depending on the issue area and the 
subject.
 8. This indicator is not limited to a specific cause of the delay, which can be either purposeful, 
that is, employed as part of a bargaining strategy, or unintended, for example, due to specific 
procedures or obstacles in the decision-making process. This reflects the fact that reluctance 
can be the result of either an unwillingness or an inability to pursue a determined and respon-
sive policy. As acknowledged by Goertz (2006), causal thoughts are always inherent in the 
process of concept formation.
 9. The notion of flip-flopping has been developed in the literature on party politics and elections 
(see, e.g., Burden, 2004: 214–215; Tavits, 2007: 154–155). Of course, it is always difficult to 
distinguish frequently changing policies from a normal process of adaptation related to learn-
ing effects or to changed circumstances, which can, ex post, easily be confused with hesita-
tion (I am grateful to Michael Brzoska for highlighting this aspect to me). If policies keep 
changing back and forth instead of developing in a linear manner, however, we can conclude 
that this will be an indicator of reluctance rather than of learning. In any case, the inclusion of 
indicators for recalcitrance, which must be in place as well, helps in assessing reluctance.
10. According to Goertz (2006: 42), ‘there are no formal reasons opposing continuous dimen-
sions for either the necessary and sufficient condition or the family resemblance concept 
structures’. While a necessary-and-sufficient-conditions structure is usually associated with a 
dichotomous view of categories, it is, indeed, possible to ‘separate the issue of dichotomous 
concepts from their structure’ (Goertz, 2006: 29).
11. Goertz points out that grey zones exist in both family resemblance and necessary-and-suffi-
cient-conditions concept structures, but are smaller in the latter (see the discussion of meas-
urement consistency and the use of the minimum operator (Goertz, 2006: 120)).
12. Interestingly, the growing body of literature on ‘rising’ or ‘emerging’ powers is characterized 
by a dearth of precise operationalizations. Besides power resources and regional preponder-
ance, many studies also include the criterion of aspiration to a greater role in world politics 
(e.g. Schirm, 2010: 198) or the peculiar negotiating position of rising powers: they are veto 
players that have not yet developed into agenda setters (Narlikar, 2013: 561–562).
13. See, for example, European Council (2011).
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